Recent English Decisions by Editors,
TARRANT vs. WEBB.
RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
In the Court of Common Pleas.
TARRANT VS. WEBB.
1. It is a well established rule of law, that a servant cannot ordinarily sue his master
for an injury sustained through the negligence of a fellow-servant; but the mas-
ter is bound to use due care in the selection of competent servants, and is liable
for negligence in employing incompetent persons.
2. He is not bound to warrant the competency of his servants; and in an action
against him for an injury done by one of his servants to another, the question for
the jury is, not whether the servant was incompetent, but whether the master did
not exercise due care in employing him.
This was an action for injury done to the plaintiff by the falling
of a scaffolding; and the declaration alleged that the plaintiff was
employed to do certain work for the defendant on a scaffolding
erected by the defendant for that purpose, and that the defendant so
carelessly and negligently erected the scaffolding that the plaintiff
was exposed to unreasonable risk, and the scaffolding gave way, and
the plaintiff was thrown therefrom, and seriously injured.
Plea-Not guilty.
At the trial, (coram Crowder, J.,) at the Middlesex sittings in
Trinity term, it appeared that the scaffolding was 'erected by a ser-
vant of the defendant; and the learned judge, in summing up, told
the jury that the defendant would be liable if he employed incom-
petent persons to erect the scaffolding. It did not appear that the
defendant knew his servant to be incompetent. Upon this the jury
found a verdict for the plaintiff, with 251. damages.
A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained on the ground of misdi-
rection, for that the employment by the defendant of incompetent
persons simply would not make him liable, and at all events would
not do so unless he knew of the incompetency, and the plaintiff
did not.
Udall showed cause.-The evidence showed that the parties
knew that it was necessary, in order to make the scaffolding
safe, to use a pole, which was not used. The objection made to the
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summing up of the learned judge was this: the case of gigmore v.
Jay (5 Exch. Rep. 354; s. c. 19 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 300) was
handed up to him and relied upon, and he ruled, according to that
case, that the ordinary rule as to the responsibility of a master for
the negligence of a servant does not apply where the person injured
is a fellow-servant, unless there be evidence that the person em-
ployed, and who caused the injury, was an improper person to
employ for the purpose in question. But it is now contended, that
another proposition is to be added to this doctrine, and that, in
order to recover against the master, it must be shown affirmatively
by the plaintiff that the master knew that the servant employed was
incompetent. That is a principle which ought not to be established.
The question was very fully considered in the case of Rutinson v.
The York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway Company, (5 Exch.
Rep. 343; s. c. 19 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 296.) That was an
action by the representative of a servant of the railway company,
killed by the negligence of another servant in guiding a locomotive
engine. The companiy pleaded that the collision happened by the
negligence of their servants employed in guiding the engines, &c.,
and not otherwise, and that their servants were fit and competent
persons for this purpose, and the plea was held good.
[JERVIS, C. J.-It may not be necessary for the other servants
to make out that the master knew of the incompetency of his servant,
but it may be enough to say that he was bound to use ordinary care
to employ competent persons.]
The learned judge told the jury that if they thought the defend-
ant interfered in the erecting of the scaffolding, or that the person
he employed was incompetent, they should find for the plaintiff. It
is contended that that was a proper direction.
[JERVIS, 0. J.-As to both points, it seems to me that it was
necessary to add something more. As to the first, if the defendant
interfered with competent skill, he would not be liable.]
In the judgment in Hutchinson v. The York, Newcastle and
Berwick Bailway Company, (5 Exch. Rep. 351,) Alderson, B. says
that "the master is not in general responsible when he has selected
persons of competent care and skill."
TARRANT Ts. WEBB.
[JERVIS, C. J.-It is not that the master must warrant the com-
petency of the persons whom he employs, but that he must take
care to select for the work persons who are competent.]
In the ordinary case, where a servant, incompetent to drive a car-
riage, does drive, and causes an accident, the master is liable.
[CRESSWELL, J.-But that is not the case of injury to a fellow-
servant.]
In Skip v. The Eastern Counties Railwag Company, (23 Law J.
Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 23,) Parke, B., says the company "are indeed
bound to see that their servants are persons of proper care and
skill," but that is all. In the case of Patterson v. Wallace & Co.,
(1 M'Queen, 748,) in the House of Lords, 4here is no qualification
of the rule laid down in Wigmore v. Jay. Lord Cranworth said,
that the law of England agreed with that of Scotland, in holding
that a master is bound to take all reasonable precautions for the
safety of his workmen.
[CBESSWELL, J.-Is not the real distinction this: that when an
injury is done by one servant to another, the rule of respondeat
superior does not apply? In such case the servant injured is bound
to go further, and to show negligence in the master in order to
make him liable. In a case of this kind, the negligence which
causes the wrong is that of the servant, and not that of the master;
and the question then arises whether there was any negligence in
the master in not employing competent servants.]
M. Smith and . .B. Hughes appeared to support the rule, but
were not called upon by the court.
JERVIS, C. J.-I am of opinion in this case that there must be a
new trial. The rule is now established, that if a workman meets
with an injury from the negligence of a fellow-workman, no action
will ordinarily lie against the master. As my brother Cresswell has
put it, the superior is not responsible as between his servants, but
he may be liable in case of negligence of his own. There may be
a doubt as to the policy of the law, but it is now quite a settled one.
Negligence may consist of more than one matter; but it cannot
exist if the master does his best to employ competent persons. le
cannot warrant the competency of his servants. The jury in this
